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By Zechariah
AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS (2 vols).
Chafee, Jr. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1947. Pp.
xiii, 830. $7.50.

GOVERNMENT

With his characteristic clarity and comprehensiveness Professor
Chafee has again illuminated numerous aspects of freedom of expression.
The book suffers, however, from the circumstances of its creation. Written as a Report from the Commission on Freedom of the Press, it is both
too detailed and too brief. Since other such reports dealing with the
radio and the motion picture have either been issued or are in process,
Professor Chafee covers these subjects too summarily. On the other
hand, he devotes over a hundred pages each to the law of libel and to the
Sherman Act and nearly as many to a. description of how the Post Office
deals with objectionable material. And since his aim here is consideration
of the normal rather than the critical situation, he touches on sedition
hardly at all.
It is probably the circumstances of the book's genesis which account
also for the lengthy quotations from views of individual but unnamed
members of the Commission. On many occasions their opinions are
offered in dialogue form with the names of the departed great substituted
for their own. It is seldom that what these persons state adds value
to the book. Certainly the form in which their opinions are presented
makes the book more difficult to read.
Despite these minor defects the work constitutes a very valuable contribution to the subject. From three quite distinct points of view it canvasses the relation of government to the media of mass communications:
the role of government as a restrictive force, as affirmative encourager
and as active participant. Professor Chafee has provocative things to say
about the most common restrictive techniques, such as the laws against
libel, obscenity and sedition, as well as about prosecutions for contempt.
He discusses at considerable length various proposals for legislation which
would protect groups from libelous attack but opposes their adoption,
pointing out both the difficulties of administration and the danger of laws
of this kind as potential boomerangs: "The remedy for bad discussion is
not punishment, but plenty of good discussion."
Professor Chafee thinks that ordinary libel laws might be improved
by the adoption, in modified form, of a French practice under which newspapers and periodicals making statements about individuals can be compelled to publish replies. This is a revolutionary proposal in American
law because such a practice would not be confined to libelous or even to
untrue statements. While the practice might make editors more careful,
it might also tend to a great diminution of all personal references, even
of complimentary ones, lest these be used as sounding boards for the selfadvertisement so common in oui time. That diminution may, of course,
constitute an improvement in journalism but it is hardly the end aimed at
in Professor Chafee's suggestion.
The section on obscenity praises Mr. Huntington Cairns, who censors
the material which passes through the Customs. On the other hand,
Professor Chafee expresses great dissatisfaction with the work of a like
nature done by the Post Office. He lists eleven problems which have
arisen in connection with its activities and he concludes that in all ob(729)
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scenity cases Congress should afford judicial review. For he believes
that judges are better guardians of civil liberties than officials, and that the
very existence of such review would improve the quality of the censor's
job.
One important problem connected with Post Office censorship is
but slightly dealt with. While Professor Chafee emphatically asserts that
the postal power is subject to the First Amendment, he considers it a
"pipe dream" to suppose that all postal censorship is unconstitutional.
He thus takes it for granted that Congress has the right to ban obscene
matter from the mails. But a strong argument can be made in support
of the proposition that obscenity is a matter which concerns the states
only (except where federal power is paramount, as in the District of
Columbia), not the national government at all. Seditious literature, on
the other hand, might be in a different category because every government
has the power to protect itself from destruction. In other words, the
right to ban written material from the mails should be no greater than
Congressional power to ban its publication altogether. It would have
been interesting had Professor Chafee indicated his views on this matter
in some detail.
Professor Chafee considers the situation of those who, themselves in
power, would deny liberty to others in the setting of the proposal by the
entire Commission that all sedition laws be repealed which are not limited
by the "clear and present danger" test. Their recommendation was based
on their belief that existing laws have an intimidating effect. Professor
Chafee notes the difficulty of framing any law which might restrict the
anti-libertarians and considers the public interest in having all points of
view heard and sore sports revealed. He points out, further, the large
margin of safety which exists in the United States: "Safety against disloyalty will come from producing the conditions which invoke loyalty in
an increasingly large number of citizens."
In discussing contempt of court, Professor Chafee holds up as a
"must" for every student, editor and broadcaster, Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion in Pennekamp v. Florida.' He asserts that many
problems in this field would disappear were the press to show greater
understanding of and interest in the work of the courts. He scores the
quality of most reporting of legal matters, indeed, the absence of any
reporting at all of much which should be covered, notably arguments before the United States Supreme Court.
Moving to the field of affirmative governmental action to encourage
ideas, Professor Chafee discusses as a "traffic regulation" the suggestion
(largely associated with Mr. Morris Ernst) that there be compulsory
disclosure of various matters. He lists three qualifications which, he says,
should underlie all disclosure statutes: the information required should be
valuable enough to justify the effort involved, the questions should be
difficult to evade, and evasion should not be condoned because the community lacks sympathy with the restrictions. On the basis of these considerations Professor Chafee accepts "disclosure of foreign affiliations but
rejects the suggestion that all propagandists be required to disclose the
source of their support. Recognizing that the public might get more truth
about the identity of such propagandists, he fears it might nevertheless
"get less truth about political and economic questions" because disclosure
laws "make it much harder to get any unpopular ideas started and disseminated."
1. 328 U. S. 331 (1945).
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After a long and much too detailed account of the anti-trust cases
which have affected the press (and here the book deals also at length
with motion pictures), Professor Chafee comes to the conclusion that the
law can do little to reduce existing concentration of power. He says:
"The press should not be responsible for its quality and points of view
to the government any more than to the advertiser or to the friends of the
owner." He dreads the suggestion that the government subsidize small
papers, either by favorable postage rates or by income tax exemptions:
"If the government sets out to coddle infant newspapers as well as infant industries the prospect is terrifying." Professor Chafee's fear is that
if the government starts out on this road it will treat the press as many
a state university is now treated: "so that its output is too often swayed
by fears of dismissal and hopes of a large appropriation."
Analogous to the government's power under the anti-trust laws is
the Federal Communication Commission's power over radio by virtue of
the necessity for allocating wave lengths. While the law expressly deprives the FCC of any power of censorship, the FCC has on occasion
taken note of content in considering applications for license renewals.
Professor Chafee deals briefly with the 1941 Mayflower decision which
restricted propaganda by station owners-which is now being further
considered by the Commission. It is too bad that Professor Chafee did
not feel free to discuss this matter because the Commission on Freedom
of the Press had been unable to reach any conclusion with regard to it.
There are three positions which could be taken: that the FCC has no right
whatever to restrict propaganda by station owners; that it can compel
station owners to give all sides equal opportunities to express their views,
and at least penalize a station which is one-sided; or finally that it can
completely prohibit one-sided propaganda. Obviously it is in the public
interest that radio stations should encourage the fullest discussion of controversial matters over the air. It is doubtful whether such discussion
will be encouraged by restricting owners from expressing their own points
of view. The more fruitful course would be to permit owners of radio
stations, as well as owners of other media of communication, to express
their individual points of view as much as they wish, giving the Commission merely the right to say that a license will not be renewed if other
points of view are not also fairly represented. This is as far as it would
seem to be good policy to go-if, indeed, constitutional objections might
not be interposed were the Commission to go any further.
Professor Chafee considers finally the role of the government when
itself a party to communications and envisions this role as operating in
two directions. The government talks to the people and it listens to the
people. Noting the high value of President Roosevelt's fireside chats
and, at least during the war, of the broadcasts by the Office of War Information, Professor Chafee points to the danger that those representing
government will really act for the interests of the party in power. He
notes also the possibility that the executive arm may by such practices
seek to by-pass Congress. Yet our author believes that opportunities for
real service exist and can be extended by improving the quality of the
material put out by the government and, where this is printed matter,
its general physical appearance. He points here to the wide sale of
General Marshall's Report as Chief of Staff. He also advocates the extensive use of the documentary film.
Professor Chafee, however, comes to no conclusion on the vexed
point whether government agencies should centralize their various information services or maintain separate ones. But he rejects the view
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that they should put out only the facts: "Much more than facts is needed
by us citizens if we are to become conscious that we are partners and
not jtist passengers in the difficult enterprise of government."
The book treats less of the work of the government as listener, partly
because less has been done. A great many devices exist (other than
Gallup polls, not here mentioned) for assaying public opinion. In the
early part of the war the Office of Facts and Figures gathered valuable
material, but it was heeded very little. Professor Chafee suggests that
a report issued by that agency in 1941 might, if acted upon, have headed
off race riots in Detroit during the following year. He notes the possibilities of abuse in the secret use of intelligence reports by various parts
of the government and suggests that all material obtained by the government be available at least to some group in Congress.
Over and above all these problems of government restriction, assistance or participation, remains, of course, that of getting a better press.
Mr. Chafee states that this can be accomplished only by greater responsibility on the part of journalists themselves. He points out that the
press is free from the government as is no other profit-making enterprise,
but that it must act worthily to justify that freedom. Newspapers and
radio operators should not forget that it is not their advertising or entertainment features to which this freedom is given. Danger of government
encroachment, Professor Chafee maintains, can come "only if the press
neglects its primary task of furnishing news and opinions in the form
which society needs."
Osmond K. Fraenkel.t

MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS UNDER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING.

Teller.
$7.50.

Baker, Voorhis & Co., Inc., New York, 1947.

By Ludwig
Pp. xvi, 468.

So many charges have been levelled against the iniquities of the
Taft-Hartley Act that it is hard to find one that has not been made. Perhaps a novel one would be to suggest that here the Act has hurt a good
book. Dean Vanderbilt's foreword, and the preface, are each dated in
May, 1947, when the probability of a sweeping new labor law was of
course clear. In page after page of the book, its reader must now recurrently wonder what the author would have said two months later in
July. It might seem unfortunate that Mr. Teller could not have waited
long enough to rewrite this book in the light of the changes which the
statute makes. But this might have meant a long delay. The real effects
of such a change as this take years to make themselves clear. And since
the book contains much of value as it is, it is probably fortunate, on balance,
that its publication was not postponed.
Mr. Teller's survey, though concentrating on the functions of management, presents a broad panorama of the crucial problems of industrial
relations. To your reviewer it is a more satisfying book than A Labor
Policy for America, written by the same author in 1945. For one thing,
it deals more with particular problems of the factory and the job, and
less with legal theories. It is impressive that Mr. Teller, foremost encyclopaedist (Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, of course) and
one of the most authoritative writers on labor law, should also show such
t Member, New York Bar.
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an intimate knowledge of the intricate facts of labor relations which often
do not reach a board or a court.
Mr. Teller makes his most important contribution by his stress on
the social interest in a freedom for management's ability to manage-to
get out the goods-an interest which has been too often disguised and
stultified by being expressed in terms of barren property rights.
In terms of a concrete labor dispute, a problem of management functions might arise in this way, for example, in the negotiation of a contract: the union might demand a provision regulating the right of the
company to send some of its work out to be done by other companies on
subcontract, instead of having it done by the company's own employees.
The union would assert that the company's use, or abuse, of the right
to subcontract affects the amount of work available to its own workers,
so that restrictions on the right constitute a condition of employment about
which collective bargaining is required by law. The company retorts that
subcontracting is a "management prerogative" for the company alone to
determine as part of its power to manage its own business.
The same sort of problem might arise in a number of different
shapes, and on a multitude of possible issues. On the issue just mentioned, the shape of the question might be whether a contract already
in existence does, or does not, limit the company's right to .subcontract.
If it does, may the company initiate subcontracting, either without notice
to the union, or upon notice to it, leaving the propriety of the action
taken to be settled in grievance procedure upon a union challenge? If
the contract does not limit the company's right, or if there is no contract,
the same sort of question may have to be answered, though now not as
one of contract interpretation.
It is your reviewer's opinion that unless the contract answers the
question in specific terms, there ought to be recognition of a gradation,
according to the facts and the nature of the thing to be done, from those
things which a company is free to do regardless of union approval or disapproval, either without consultation with the union, or, in other cases,
upon reasonable notice to it, on through things which a company is free
to initiate, either without notice or with notice, but subject to union
challenge in grievance procedure, down at last to things which the company is not free even to initiate without union approval. The union is
bound, to some extent, to recognize company decisions in such matters as
controlling, unless made arbitrarily or in bad faith. But here, too, it
is believed no rules can wisely be made, but the degree of such finality
ought to be tailored to fit the facts and the particular function involved.
(Mr. Teller does not entirely agree with this approach).
A few other typical issues, among an almost infinite number, which
may raise questions of management function, are the scheduling of hours
of work, the making of shop rules, the imposing of discipline, the award
of pay increases for merit, the establishment of group insurance, and
the institution of severance pay.
Mr. Teller reacts strongly against the view of the extremists who
insist that management functions, (or "management prerogatives" in the
"fighting words" of the bargaining table) should be excluded by fiat from
the subject-matter of bargaining. Those functions which constitute the
shifting, but very real, core of the power to run a successful business,
must be protected. But this is not a matter for legislation, but for building bit by bit an intelligent scheme of cooperation. The clause in the
abortive Ball-Burton-Hatch Bill, for example, which would have deprived
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unions of any right to interfere with the "functions of an employer's
management organization... or to prevent the enforcement of managerial
directions or policies . . . or

.

.

. to . . . hamper . . . an employer

S* .1 in exercising the normal and reasonable authority of management,"
is vigorously condemned. Mr. Teller shows the absurdity of any such
approach to a question of functions which must vary from industry to
industry. In most industries, for example, changes in day-to-day job assignments would be a matter calling for the unions' approval; whereas in
the textile industry, because of changes in fabric construction, this has
been held by the National War Labor Board to be a management function.
Mr. Teller argues, as he did also convincingly argue in A Labor
Policy for America, that the law courts are not appropriate or competent
forums to handle industrial disputes. He reacts strongly, as he has consistently done, against any form of compulsory arbitration of the merits
of labor disputes. He suggests again, as he did before, a series of "labor
courts," which would be more administrative agencies than courts, and
which would deal not in the outcome of labor disputes but in the "rules
of the game" and the methods by which the disputants might lawfully
seek to gain their ends.
Mr. Teller turns to the National War Labor Board and to the labor
arbitrators . (chapters three and four, respectively) as the only tribunals
which- have done any significant work in building up the vitally needed
body of jurisprudence which must be built for this crucial field. His
reviews of their decisions, about what particular subjects, should be
treated as management functions, form perhaps the most valuable part
of the book. The lack of any such body of law (or informed opinion
grounded in a knowledge of what has been done in similar cases) is easy
to understand when it is remembered, as the author points out, that the
issue was never consciously grappled with as a labor dispute until about
the time of the establishment of the National War Labor Board.
Mr. Teller's main contention, harmonious with most of the decisions
to which he refers, is that in these fields, management should, pursuant
to carefully drawn contract clauses, have sole responsibility for initiating
changes, with provision that in the event of any complaint, there should
be no work stoppage, but the complaint should be handled through
grievance procedures with compulsory arbitration as the final step, and
with a recognized obligation to support the decisions of management
unless they are shown to be arbitrary or done with malicious or illegal
motive. Any alternative, he thinks, must present a division of authority
which is likely to be fatal to efficiency.
In a brief historical sketch of business management in Russia since
the Bolshevik revolution, he shows how the "triangle" system (which distributed authority among three: the plant manager, the workers and the
party representative) broke down and had to be replaced by a system
which concentrated authority in the hands of a single manager. The
treatment is so brief, and unbiased information about industrial Russia
so hard to come by, that one cannot but wonder whether the ten pages
which Mr. Teller devotes to this subject tell the whole story and, if so,
whether the lesson he draws may be based upon such differences between
Russia and this country that the lesson itself is less significant than it
appears. These are mere random doubts, however, with neither proof
nor conviction to back them up.
Mr. Teller analyzes the labor-relations plans of certain special employers; and he discusses several general proposals which have been urged
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by persons who are well-meaning but (he thinks) soft-headed. Among
these are the proposal that representatives of a company's workers, and
of its consumers, should sit on its board of directors, as full or advisory
members. He is only less skeptical of the guaranteed wage, although he
recognizes the force of some arguments in its favor in the Latimer Report.
He grows mildly enthusiastic, at last, over the Employment Act of 1946,
which passed -at the expense of the more drastic Murray Full Employment Bill. He notes that, in spite of much union sentiment for the Murray
Bill, unions have never shown a disposition to submit to such regulations over wages, jobs and the movement of workers as would be needed
if the government were to undertake to abolish unemployment in a way
similar to that in which it undertook to win the war. Mr. Teller notes
that the Beveridge Plan had to grapple with a task much easier than
that of insuring full employment in the United States, because of the
greater variety of our industries, technological processes and types of
worker. (He also notes that Mr. Beveridge never proposed use of the
guaranteed annual wage, and that even Mr. Hansen in this country puts
small faith in it.)
Throughout the analysis there is hard-headed recognition that what
may do good in one way must also be tested by the harm that it would
do in other ways.
So much for Part One which deals with these and many other troubles.
Part Two proceeds to a more detailed consideration, and an attempted
clarification, of what the powers of management must be, to bring forth
maximum production. Freedom to exploit new invention stands high
on the list of desiderata, so that any interference with this, along with all
sorts of "featherbedding," ought to be outlawed. Profit sharing comes
in for a trouncing as an idealistic scheme which evinces a fundamental
misconception of union thinking and union objectives. Wage incentives and
piece work plans, on the other hand, are recognized as fairly valuable,
and these are analyzed and discussed in some detail. Next we have the
closed shop, which Mr. Teller would make illegal and the union shop,
which he would allow. This reviewer is of opinion that he gives too
little weight to the successful functioning of the closed shop in many
segments of our industry, but Mr. Teller's view has prevailed in the
Taft-Hartley Act and it will, within the next year, receive its baptism
of fire. Whether the new law's prohibition on closed shop will work, or
whether it will prove to be one of those ill-conceived and vindictive legislative proposals which Mr. Teller condemns in other connections, the near
future will decide. For the country's good we must all hope that Mr.
Teller is right.
The troublesome problem of the jurisdictional dispute is to be settled
by Mr. Teller's "labor court." Under Taft-Hartley the Board will decide
such disputes and thus give a trial to the idea of "compulsory arbitration" (which Mr. Teller appears to favor in this particular field).
Mr. Teller's discussion of supervisory employees' is one of the most
interesting parts of his interesting book. The changes made by the TaftHartley Act contrast sharply with the author's realistic appreciation of a
foreman's position and problems in our new mass-production industries.
The fact that a simpler approach has here prevailed promises to furnish
more explosive material for the near future.
There follows the highly debatable subject of industry-wide bargaining. Mr. Teller shows, by way of example, what the experience with
it has been in England and in Sweden. In this instance Mr. Teller does
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suggest that the experience of other countries, with a different history and
different kinds of union, may not be a safe guide here.
The rest of the book urges responsibility upon both sides of the
bargaining table, with the sharpest digs and the most exhortation reserved
for the labor side of it.
The writing is marred by occasional carelessness or clumsiness, but
in general is clear and easy to read. And it would be ungracious indeed
to be captious, where the slips occasionally furnish such pleasure as does
the reference (p. 357) to an infant labor movement "in dawdling clothes."
Nor are the gems all inadvertent, either, for Mr. Teller was inspired
when he referred to Hunt v. Crumboch, (325 U. S. 821) a case arising
out of a murder, as "the culmination of the homicide committed upon the
courts by the Norris Act."
Like all Mr. Teller's writings, this book is a thought-provoking contribution to a vitally important field.
Bertram F. Willcox.t

PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF CONTRACTS.

By Grover C. Grismore. The

Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, 1947.

pp. lxiii, 538.

$6.00.

In traditional style, Professor Grismore has carefully and thoroughly
treated in the traditional way all of the traditional principles of the law
of Contracts. Here, then, is a book tailor-made for the traditional review. The reviewer has only to make the traditional assumption that any
such meticulous restatement of a body of concepts is automatically a
contribution to legal literature and his plan of attack is clear. An appreciative recognition of a painstaking piece of work, an involved disagreement or two with the author's statement of some insignificant bits
of doctrine (inserted both to prove he read the book and to preserve his
reputation for independence of thought) and the reviewer has added to his
bibliography another evidence of his productivity as a scholar.
There is, unfortunately, an insurmountable obstacle to my use of
such a technique: I cannot bring myself to make the necessary basic
assumption. For I doubt, in the first place, whether any text which
sets out to clarify the law by carefully constructing a card house of concepts can ever do more good than it does harm. The seeming stability
of such a logical structure-achieved only by divorcing doctrine from the
reality of the individual case-lulls too many students into a false sense
of security. That most students admittedly and understandably yearn
for such security makes placing such a book in their hands all the more
hazardous. Such a card house can safely be used only if constant classroom exposure clearly demonstrates that factual jars and drafts make
card houses collapse. Employed by able and understanding teachers, the
structure has some utility in introducing students to the way courts and
lawyers talk about the solution of disputes. In the hands of unimaginative
teachers, who themselves believe that such a restatement contains the
answers to important questions in the law, it is a dangerous instrument.
The competent teacher has no need of it. The incompetent teacher cannot
teach without it.
But even conceding that such a carefully built card house has some
pedagogical value, the need is scarcely great enough to justify row housing.
t Associate Professor, Cornell University Law School.
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The law of Contracts has already been stated and restated. Unless, therefore, Professor Grismore's structure (1) is built on new conceptual ground
or (2) adds a more attractively designed unit to the old row of pasteboard fronts, it is a needless piece of construction. How does the book
stand up when measured even by these limited standards?
Since Professor Grismore states in his preface that his sole purpose
has been to "present the fundamental principles of the law of Contracts
as clearly and concisely as possible," and that "the choice of topics has
been determined very largely by the conventional basic Law School course
on the subject," 1 his book could hardly be expected to break new conceptual ground. And any hope that this statement of his objectives might
perhaps be overly modest is dashed once the book is examined. So far
as subject matter is concerned, Professor Grismore has done exactly what
he set out to do. Except for some rephrasing and rearranging of already
established concept patterns, he has nothing to offer which is not already
supplied in too great abundance by the Restatement of Contracts and
Williston's Students' Edition.
How, then, does the book stand up on the second count? For any
book that presents even well worn doctrine in a refreshing and interesting
way, that really manages to clarify the subject by explaining the traditional
concepts in simple and down-to-earth language, that is-in short-a useful textbook, still deserves publication. Personally I should rate any such
book a genuine contribution if it did no more than help dispel the notion
that law must be presented as dull and big-worded stuff. How about
Professor Grismore's book? A sample of the text gives the answer.
Here, for instance, is 2 the author's explanation of the difference between a
contract and a sale:

"At other times the word [contract] is used to designate a certain transaction, such as a sale or a conveyance, which arises out of
an agreement and results in new legal relationships, but does not
involve any undertaking to do or to refrain from doing anything in
the future. Thus, if A sells and delivers an automobile to B and is paid
a price therefor, it is sometimes said that a contract has been created.
This is not a contract in the sense in which the word has been described above, but a sale. Such an agreement creates no outstanding
obligation but effects at once a transfer of rights in rem. However,
it is otherwise when there is coupled with such a transaction one or
more undertakings for the future, as when the future delivery of the
goods, or the future payment of the price or a warranty is provided
for. In such a case a contract in the sense indicated results, as well
as a sale."
Ten pages of passages like this, complete with footnotes, were more
than enough to spike my hope that here I might find-at last and at
least-a simply stated textbook. Not merely unreadable, it is comprehensible only to one who already understands the subject and is searching,
not for clarification, but for ways of, stating a position or for additional
case ammunition to bolster that position. Devoid of examples with flesh
on their bones, full of the majority and minority rules in traditional
"most jurisdictions . . . many courts, however . . . but a few cases
hold

.

.

."

style, achieving compactness by cryptic statement rather

than by elimination of non-essentials, it has all the imagination and fire of
1. P. iii.
2. P. 2.
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the average law review note. It is miles away from the type of text for
which Karl Llewellyn has been beating the drum-a text which "seeks to
reduce a difficult matter to a deep but simple presentation, the kind of
thing a student needs (1) to introduce him to the subject; (2) to help
him, while he is studying the subject, and (3) to solidify everything when
he reviews the subject. Or to save him the need of taking a course in the
subject." Can a text such as Llewellyn describes be written in the field of
Contracts? I concede that it would be a difficult task. I also concede
that it could be achieved only at the expense of systematic statement of
every aspect of every "fundamental principle." But that it can be done
in a field of equal difficulty is demonstrated by such a rare article as
Fred Rodell's A Primer on Interstate Taxation.4 If it can be done there,
it can be done here.
Such a textbook could accurately be titled: Fundamental Principles
of the Law of Contracts. For it would present meaningful principles in
a meaningful fashion. It would explain one principle--not in terms of
another principle, equally confusing and meaningless-but in terms of how
men behave and institutions operate and courts respond to societal pressures. It would be content to state "rules" which covered less than the
totality of situations, leaving dissimilar situations to be covered by
different rules. It would, in other words, refuse to construct or to support
a complicated system of generalizations merely to extend the illusion of
inevitability to the maximum number of questions on which courts have
spoken. Unencumbered by inconsequential detail and unobscured by
senseless verbiage, it would enable a sttident to get a real grasp of what
courts are doing and why. That is the sort of job Professor Grismord
might have done. Until a text writer is found who is willing to do it,
further publication of textbooks in the field of Contracts should be discouraged.
Addison Mueller.t

CASES

AND

MATERIALS

ON WILLS

AND

ADMINISTRATION.

Mechem and Thomas E. Atkinson. Third Edition.
tion Press, Brooklyn, 1947. Pp. xv, 732, $7.50.
CASES AND TEXT ON THE LAW OF WILLS.

By Philip
The Founda-

By W. Barton Leach. Second

Edition. Published jointly by the Editor, Harvard Law School,
Cambridge, and The Law School Press, Los Angeles, 1947: Pp. xvi,

302.

$4.50.

CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF DECEDENTS'

ESTATES.

By Max Rheinstein. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis,
1947. Pp. xiii, 1295. $8.50.
At the turn of the century Johh Chipman Gray ruled over the realm
of Property with undisputed sway. His six-volume casebook on Property
was accepted as the standard text wherever the case system had found
its way. Formidable as it looked, it made no attempt to cover the wide
field of property on which equity based its jurisdiction nor to include
3. H AND]BOOK, THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERIcAN LAW SCHOOLS 22 (1946).
4. 44 YALE L. J. 1166 (1935).
t Associate Professor, Yale School of Law.
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such familiar property landmarks as Trusts, Vendor and Purchaser, Mortgages, or Landlord and Tenant. The field of Trusts had already been
appropriated and possibly the other subjects smacked too much of the
practice. The law was to be treated as a science and not as an art. In pursuance of this end, real and personal property were brought under one head
and an orderly arrangement followed throughout the six volumes, although
Volume VI was more or less of a miscellany. This scientific arrangement
has very largely dominated the field of Property ever since. Trusts has
maintained its independence, although the attempt has been made to bring
it and Future Interests and Wills together. Vendor and Purchaser and
Landlord and Tenant have been made the subject of separate casebooks,
but without great success. Mortgages has been a good deal of a lost
soul.
When Gray died and his kingdom fell apart, its various fragments
remained more or less intact but received names that were none too happy,
while Property became the name of a series instead of a single casebook.
Personal property was detached from the rest of property and made into
a separate volume. Volume II of Gray became Rights in Land, which
would seem to have been as broad as real property itself. Volume III
became Titles or Conveyances. Neither of these heads was a familiar
title in the law though the words were common enough as legal terms.
Volume IV became Wills and Administration. In student parlance the
corresponding course has become known as Wills. To the profession
at large, Wills means the field covered by the classic text on Wills,Jarman. This and other standard texts on Wills are largely taken up
with the construction of limitations and the law of property incident
thereto. With these matters Volume IV of Gray and its successors have
had very little concern. Such matters were taken up in Volume V. As
concerned wills, Volume IV dealt in the main with the minutiae of their
execution and revocation rather than with their dispositive provisions.
If Wills leaves out most of what the profession would suppose it to indude, on the other hand it includes the field covered by the old canons
of descent which, of course, is not testamentary at all. As matters of
descent have long been largely statutory, they were given scant attention
by Gray notwithstanding their great intrinsic importance. Volume V became Future Interests, a title which Professor Leach with masterly
understatement has called an "unfortunate label." Family Settlements or
Settled Property, although somewhat English, would have been far more
descriptive and accurate. Future interests proper were contingent remainders and executory interests, but not reversions, nor vested remainders nor powers. All these together with possessory interests went
into the making of the family settlement. To study settled property under
the heading of Future Interests is to get a wrong slant on a subject whose
outstanding characteristic is not futurity, but solidity and permanence.
Of the three books under review, that of Mechem and Atkinson has
followed most closely the traditional lines marked out by Vol. IV of
Gray. Not long since, its second edition was used in a majority of the
101 law schools using the leading casebooks on Wills. That speaks
volumes for its usability, its teachability. Although the scope of the book
is that of Gray, its method of approach is distinctly up-to-date. The introduction has the rather forbidding title: The Rationale of Succession.
Descent and Distribution are treated much more adequately than in Gray;
there are a few introductory notes and frequent, carefully worked-out
footnotes. The third edition presents no marked departure from the second.
Provisions of the Model Probate Code prepared by a committee of the
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Probate Division of the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust
-Law of the American Bar Association are added. The case law is brought
up to date; the total bulk is somewhat reduced. In general, the editors
stand pat on what they feel has been a successful venture. Granted the
name, a course of three or at least two hours, and that a casebook should
be a teaching tool only and not a source book, this casebook leaves little
to be desired. But all three of these are big grants.
Professor Leach's casebook is cut down for a course of twenty class
room hours or approximately a one-hour semester course. This was
occasioned by the change in the Harvard curriculum some years ago, but
is in accord with Professor Leach's convictions after fifteen years of
teaching the subject. This also accords with the writer's views after
twenty years of teaching Gray and Warren. The time they gave to the
making and revocation of wills seemed indefensible in an all-too-crowded
schedule. A one hour course, however, is a misfit, and Harvard has met
this by combining Wills with what is generally known as Future Interests.
Some years ago Columbia went even futher in combining Wills and
Future Interests and Trusts, to get an all-around picture of estate-planning. Taxation would now have to be added as well. Clearly there is
work for the curriculum-makers to do. The effort at Columbia some
twenty years ago enriched the curriculum, but the effort spent itself and
now the same old need is felt, but more insistently than ever, for some
vital change that will make the law schools of today do for our times what
the law schools of the Middle Ages did for theirs, Courses can't be too
long, but a vital subject like property can at least be integrated so that
it is not a mere collection of rules, but a living thing. For this purpose
the group system recently inaugurated at Northwestern offers many possibilities.
The second edition of Leach differs in the main from the first in the
addition, as chapters, of two law review articles which have attracted wide
attention: Chapter X, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, and Chapter XI, Planning and Drafting a Will for a Particular Middle-Aged Man with a
Family and Considerable Wealth. These chapters represent a wide break
from the traditional routine in Wills but are understandable with Wills
as a part of the course in Future Interests. Furthermore, they represent
a wide departure from traditional case-book theory and discard the outmoded clich6 dating back at least as far as Story that law should be
studied as a science and not as an art. Perpetuitiesin a Nutshell was recently commended by Professor Llewellyn as a brilliant example of the
sort of thing he has been urging as necessary to round out the case-method
technique. Vivid legal writing has never been too common in our country
and the case system and the Restatementhave tended to lessen what little
we have had. We may hope with Professor Llewellyn that Perpetuities
in a Nutshell is a harbinger of better things.
Professor Leach has long been a proponent of getting to the student
the point of view of the draftsman or perhaps more broadly, the point of
view of counsel. This is admittedly only one of many points of view, but
is in many ways the supreme point of view, for the constructive element in
the law has probably been not the courts nor the legislatures, but the
legal profession. The courts have adopted the views of successful counsel
and worthwhile legislation has at least been shaped by lawyers. How to
get something more of this point of view to the law student is one of the
problems that faces the law schools today. The study of the cases alone
is inadequate for, wonderful teaching tools that they are, they represent
but one point of view, that of the appellate judge. The law teacher may
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supplement this somewhat but very likely he too is removed from the
practice. His is still another point of view.
Professor Leach sums up his and Professor Casner's experience in
"trying to find an effective method of introducing students to the art of
planning estates and drafting dispositive instruments." 1 He dismisses (b)
the discussion of "cases in the. classroom with a view to evaluating the
draftsmanship of the instrument being litigated" as "useful" but "largely
negative" and pronounces (c) the "classroom criticism of instruments
drafted by students-an unmitigated failure-the process--extremely dull
and prohibitively time-consuming". (a) Lecturing and writing on segments of the problem, e. "g. Chapter X, he evidently thinks worth while.
The experiment (d) started in 1946 by Professor Casner of "presenting documents, some good and some with intentionally planted errors, to
the students, directing them to analyze the documents, and in an examination calling for criticisms of specific portions of the documents and
analysis of the effects of specified clauses he regards as promising."
Chapter XI is an attempt to supplement (a) and (b). It treats the
specific problem of one client in its entirety in contrast to type (a). It
gives an affirmative and constructive approach, in contrast to type (b).
This frank appraisal of the experiment in the draftsmanship approach
is most enlightening. It does not show that the oldsters were wrong in
excluding draftsmanship from the law school curriculum but it does show
a courageous attempt to prove they were wrong and an honest report on
the results so far attained. Whether very much can be done with presentsized faculties and present organization of faculties and present organization of the curriculum seems very doubtful. But that the planning of estates will occupy an honored place somewhere in the law school curriculum in the not too distant future would seem almost inevitable.
Professor Rheinstein's book avoids the misleading title, Wills, but
substitutes another, Decedents' Estates, likewise misleading but with much
less glamor. The title is not Administration of Decedents' Estates but
that is what the profession is likely to take it to be. In fact there is no
good technical common law term to indicate the whole field of succession
at death. And yet this field is one of the most significant in the whole
law. Its importance goes back to the beginning of things and has not
lessened but rather increased with time. Its significance wil continue
to be world-wide as long as private property persists. This is no subject to be treated along narrow and technical lines. Here'is no place for
a narrow case law treatment. All the light that history and comparative
law and philosophy can throw on the subject should be made to bear on it.
For this purpose Professor Rheinstein's training makes him particularly
suited and his book is more adequate than either of the others.
Professor Rheinstein also tackles the matter of collateral reading. He
integrates much of the law review material into his text. He does not
expect a good part of it to be discussed in class but it is there to be read
and pondered over and to be really available. In this sense his book is
a source book. Others before Langdell had urged the study of the cases
but he made them physically accessible by careful selection and inclusion
in a casebook. Professor Rheinstein has performed a similar task for
law review material. It should help solve the problem of collateral read-'
ing.
Percy Bordwell.t
1. LEAcH, preface, pp. v-vi.

t Professor, State University of Iowa, College of Law.
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By Charles E. Clark.
West Publishing Co., St. Paul, 1947. Pp. xvi,

OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING.

Second Edition.
744. $6.00.

Just how much effect the first edition of this book had in stimulating
and shaping the procedural activity of the past twenty years cannot be
accurately determined. The part played by its author is easier to appraise.
Judge Clark has been the dominant figure in a period of intense nationwide procedural reform. It is generally thought, although so far as I
know the story has not been told authoritatively, that it was largely his
influence which moved the Supreme Court to proceed under that section
of the basic statute which authorized united rules for law and equity in
the federal district courts. He has served as Reporter for the Advisory
Committee of the Supreme Court from the outset, and the Federal Rules
bear unmistakably his imprint. Time and events made necessary a new
edition of his book, and it is fortunate that Judge Clark was himself able
to prepare it.
Basically the book is unchanged. Coverage and chapter arrangement
are identical with the first edition. With very minor exceptions, the sections also are the same. This edition seeds into the appropriate places
all of the lively legislative and judicial history of the intervening years.
That job has been done without sacrificing the historical miniatures which
introduced each major topic and which contributed so much to the usefulness of the earlier book. Here, too, is the same remarkably skillful exposition under the most severe limitations of space which marked the first
edition. The authoritative treatment of the Federal Rules in conjunction
with parallel state provisions enhances the usefulness of the new edition
to the profession and to students.
Not only is the book unchanged in basic coverage. More important,
the philosophy of the book remains unchanged-almost, one might say,
aggressively unchanged. In none of his writings in the field of procedure
has Judge Clark been just an observer. Always his writings have been
stamped with his own philosophy of procedure, and particularly of the
function to be performed by pleadings in a modern system. And that is
as it should be, for procedure, dealt with simply as a colorless exposition
of a mass of detail is deadly dull; and worse, such a treatment augments
the danger of excessive introspection and refinement from which no procedural system is ever entirely free.
The work as a whole is excellent, and the field covered is so broad
that specific criticisms seem petty. Yet the author's positions are so
firmly taken and so much advocacy is mixed with exposition that the
temptation is irresistible. The stature of the author, too, makes important
even those statements which, made by another, might be dismissed as of
minor significance.
It seems to me that advocacy carries too far when Mr. Justice
Cardozo's decision in United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co.1 is treated
by Judge Clark, as it has been by his adherents in the past, as affording
support to his concept of a cause of action as "such an aggregate of operative facts as will give rise to at least one right of action." It is true that
a somewhat similar approach was applied in the Memphis Cotton Oil Co.
case where the specific problem was amendment after the statute of limitations. But Mr. Justice Cardozo was far from adopting the Clark concept for general application in all situations. He expressly stated, "This
1. 288 U. S. 62 (1933).
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court has not committed itself to the view that the phrase [cause of action] is susceptible of any single definition that will be independent of the
context or of the relation to be governed." And his view was made even
more explicit in Gully v. First National Bank in Meridiam2 where he
said, referring to the Memphis Cotton Oil Co. case, "This Court has had
occasion to point out how futile is the attempt to define a 'cause of action'
without reference to the context."
Judge Clark's approach seems fundamentally different to me. His
definition of a cause of action does not depend upon the problem involved.
It remains steadfast despite the context. Whether the problem is one
of joinder (p. 455), splitting (p. 477) or amendment (p. 731), the same
concept is insisted upon. The notion of a cause of action as a group of
operative facts viewed from a layman's point of view operates admirably
in the field of amendments. But when this loosely outlined concept of a
cause of action is moved bodily into the field of res judicata and applied to
the problem of splitting a cause of action, the results become less satisfactory. The doctrine of res judicata operates with finality; its thrust is
mortal. The rigidity of the common law at the pleading stage exacted
an extremely heavy toll in terms of costs and delay, but even its severity
did not result in the complete extinguishment of the rights of a litigant.
Judge Clark recognizes but minimizes this difficulty (pp. 144-5, 478).
He speaks of "a fear of shutting off action by a party who may seem not
to have presented his case any too well in earlier litigation he has lost,"
(p. 144) and of "judical tenderness toward defeated litigants." (p. 145).
But of course the rule against splitting a cause of action is not confined
to defeated litigants. It operates just as drastically upon the successful
litigant whose only sin may be that his original estimate as to the limits
of trial convenience does not coincide with the later estimate of the same
or another court.
In discussing criticisms of the operation of his concept of a cause of
action in the field of res judicata, Judge Clark expresses his readiness to
believe that the direction of procedural reform should be toward compulsory joinder-apparently meaning compulsory joinder of "all items
of dispute between litigants." The treatment here is casual, and perhaps
not intended to be taken too seriously. The idea is advanced as one
suggested by others,3 and it is discussed only in terms of difficulties anticipated in securing its general adoption. There are, of course, far more
basic considerations.
A rule which forces the present assertion of all claims between litigants upon peril of forfeiture for non-assertion certainly provides an
automatic solution for the problem of splitting causes of action. But the
historic policy of discouraging litigation has roots which lie deeper than
considerations of procedural convenience. If that policy is to be disturbed, it should be because the philosophy upon which it is based is unsound and not because it complicates the operation of a procedural doctrine. Private litigation is conducted largely at public expense. That
fact may be thought to justify the intrusion of considerations of trial convenience into the operation of the rule against splitting a cause of action.
2.299 U. S. 109 (1936).
3. It does not seem to me that either Prof. Blume (The Scope of a Civil Action,
42 MIcH. L. Rlv. 257 (1943)) or Mr. Schopflocher (What is a Single Cause of Action
for Purposes of the Doctrine of Res Judicata?, 21 OSEGoN L. REv. 319 (1942)), the
critics referred to by Judge Clark (pp. 144-146) takes the position ascribed to them.
Their suggestions as to compulsory joinder are bounded by identity of transaction or
existence of common question.
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But trial convenience at most extends no farther than the common question
situation. It has no relevance in considering a rule requiring indiscriminate joinder of all matters of dispute between litigants.
To eliminate delay, Judge Clark urges a single hearing for the
disposition of the case and expresses a distinct antipathy to multiple stages
of argument and decision before trial. He advocates the English "objection in law," to be filed with the answer and considered in advance
of trial only if the judge feels that a decision will substantially dispose
of the entire case. Apparently he contemplates that the trial judge will
independently select for hearing in advance of trial those cases in which
a decision will substantially dispose of the entire case; the suggested rule
of the American Judicature Society is criticized because "there would
seem possibility of delay for a hearing as to whether the objection should
or should not be heard before trial." (p. 539, n. 137).
Judge Clark has effectively diagnosed the past fault of overloading
the pleading stage of a lawsuit--of placing upon the pleadings a greater
stress than they are capable of bearing. It seems to me that there may
be a similar possibility of overloading the trial stage. There is an
essential practicality in the common law effort to dispose of a case, where
possible, upon the law without a trial, which should not be lightly abandoned. Of course, the demurrer and its substitutes can be and have
been abused. But always, until we go frankly to a system of notice pleading, there will remain a group of cases susceptible of disposition upon
the pleadings.
Apparently Judge Clark's position and the amended
Federal Rule 12-which moves in that direction-are based upon statistics indicating that a relatively small percentage of cases (about 9%o) are
disposed of upon demurrer and similar motions and objections. 4 Even
considering, as these statistics do, only those cases in which final judgment results, the percentage does not seem negligible.
As a practical matter, I should doubt that postponement until the
trial stage is going to cause lawyers to abandon matters in abatement
and objections in point of law. I suspect that the ardor of the advocate
is going to survive the delay. But unless postponement does result in a
substantial diminution in the number of such matters presented, there will
be net loss instead of gain. All the cast of characters necessary for
a trial parties, witnesses, jurors, etc.,-will await, at public and private
expense, the presentation and determination of a matter which requires
only the presence of court and counsel. The atmosphere, one may
suspect, will hardly be conducive to deliberate presentation and consideration. And the litigants will be compelled, in an undetermined percentage
of the cases, to pay counsel for his preparation of phases of the case which
ultimately become academic.
Many would not agree with these reactions of mine; others would
find their faults with portions of the book to which I subscribe enthusiastically. That sort of reaction is unavoidable when so broad a field
is discussed and when positions are so firmly taken. In no sense does
that reaction detract from the quality of the book or from its usefulness.
Such is the significance of Judge Clark's book that within the foreseeable
future no procedural change of consequence is going to be made without
reckoning with it.
Walter V. Schaefer.t
4. P. 561.
t Professor, Northwestern University School of Law.
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By William Seagle.
HAmMURABI TO HOLMES.
The Macmillan Company, New York, 1947, Pp. 391. $5.00.
Macaulay once said that the history of the world is the history of
its great men. At least telling the stories of great men is one way of
writing history. In his earlier volume on the history of law,1 Mr.
Seagle confessed that a biographical approach to the subject presented
very strong temptations. Fortunately for the pleasure and edification
of the bar, Mr. Seagle did succumb to temptation. Men of Law, written
in his graceful and lucid style, traces the world-lines of some fourteen
heroes of law, and does for the history of law what Will Durant did
for the history of philosophy. The book avoids many of the limitations
of the biographical approach by inclusion of considerable institutional
background, and by treatment of men whose lives and work formed the
foci of legal developments.
Mr. Seagle's introduction is concerned with a short history of Ug,
primitive man, responsible for the two greatest of all legal advances, the
Court and the Word. Ug left us no records, but with the invention of
the written word it became possible to promulgate codes of law. The
Code of Hammurabi, full of such interesting features as price-fixing, was
inscribed in cuneiform on a stone pillar in the Temple at Sippara for
all men to see. The philosophy of Hammurabi is attractively simple:
"The oppressed who has a lawsuit shall come before my image as king
of justice. He shall read the writing on my pillar, he shall perceive
my precious words. The words of my pillar shall explain to him his
cause, and he shall find his right." But can the oppressed be protected
so simply from the cunning of the strong? Solon of Athens, although
known to generations as the Law Giver, is more rightly distinguished
for his attempts to reform Athenian democracy. While he probably had
the simple faith in law that Hammurabi possessed, Solon sought to
preserve justice for all men by better administration of law.
In Rome, we find for the first time the "fictions, evasions, duplicities,
and subtleties" which betray the activities of a professional class of law
men,--advocates and jurists-the, latter answering legal inquiries as
they strolled about the Forum. Our knowledge of the law of the classical
period derives, however, not from a lawyer, but from the lectures of
one of the first law teachers, the Institutes of Gaius. The law had now
become old enough for jurisprudence; lawyers sought to set up against
the letter of the law, ratio verborum, the life of the law, ratio legis. Gaius
tells us, for example, of the interesting use of a property concept in the
family law field. In Roman law a wife could avoid the subjection to her
husband which arose from a marriage based upon customary cohabitation,
by absenting herself from his house for three nights each year, thereby
breaking the prescriptive period. The great compilation of Roman law,
the corpus iuris civilis, was completed under the orders of Justinian,
Emperor of the East, and he is also responsible for the textbook, the
Imperatoris JustinianiInstitutiones, which was really nothing more than
a revised edition of Gaius. These works formed the fountainhead of the
laws of the modern European states, but the origin of law between states
is found in the great work De Jure Belli ac Pacis of the Dutchman, Hugo
Grotius. Grotius was fired by the revolutionary concept that nations as
well as men should be under law. As Hammurabi had wanted the rights
of the oppressed to be protected by law, so Grotius believed that the
destinies of all nations should be subject to the higher, the natural law.
MEN OF LAW: FROM

1. SEAGLE, THE QUEST FOR LAw, xiii

(1941).
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While the laws of the continental states were being worked out on
the Roman model, in England meanwhile a body of law was struggling to
become common to all Englishmen, not merely the law of the churchmen, merchants or lords. It was the dream of Lord Coke, Chief Justice
of the Common Pleas, and "one of the most arrogant and avaricious of
men" that even the King should submit to the charms of his Lady, the
Common Law. Coke's expositions of the common law are so much a
part of the fabric of our modern life, that we no longer recognize
his Institutes as the source, for example, of the phrase "Every man's house
is his castle." But even before the work of Lord Coke, the three great
courts of Common Law had been fashioned, the King's Council had
grown into the Parliament, the Frankish device of the sworn inquest
had been transmuted into jury trial, and the Statutes of Westminster
First and Second, the Statute of Mortmain, and the Statute of Merchants
had been passed, in the reign of Edward Plantagenet. Finally, the Court
of Chancery was forged out of the crucible of the King's conscience,
which court under Thomas Egerton (later Baron Ellesmere) emerged
the victor from the war between law and equity.
By the time of Sir William Blackstone, the common law had become,
as Gibbon put it, "a mysterious science and a profitable trade." Blackstone's Commentaries, his lectures as the first Vinerian Professor of the
Laws of England at Oxford, sought to explain the mysterious science
to the gentlemen of England. Most of the mysteries, of course, concerned the sacred institution of property. Unfortunately the liberties of
men were in neglect; so much so on the continent that one judge in
Saxony, during office, imposed twenty thousand capital sentences. Such
brutal conditions impinging upon the sensitivities of a young Italian
nobleman, Cesare Bonesana, Marchese di Becarria, inspired him in his
essay, Of Crimes and Punishments, to create the subject which we now
study as criminal law. Becarria's work in crimes is very naturally juxtaposed to the writings of a man of whom Maine once said: "I do not know
of a single law reform effected since Bentham's day which cannot be
traced to his influence." Jeremy Bentham, indeed the greatest law reformer of all time, sought to make the science of legislation the supreme
panacea. The law for him, too, had become a mysterious science and
with Hammurabi he attempted to delineate and set out men's rights in
comprehensive schemes of legislation, based on the postulates enunciated
in his Principles of Morals and Legislation.
For an American lawyer, the struggle of Chief Justice Marshall to
make the sovereign subject to law is a twice-told tale. Marshall's two
absorbing devotions were to his invalid wife, "dearest Polly," and to the
concept of judicial review. With bold strokes in Marbury v. Madison he
accomplished what Coke had failed to do. Nor was Marshall averse to
defending his many unpopular decisions by writing anonymous tracts in
their support. While it is even probable that he wrote the opinion in
M'Culloch v. Maryland months before he heard the oral argument, he is
reported to have said: "The acme of judicial distinction means the ability
to look a lawyer straight in the eyes for two hours and not hear a damned
word he says."
To Coke we owe the doctrine of the rule of law, and to Marshall
that of judicial review, but it is to the German legal philosopher, Rudolph
von Jhering, that we owe freedom from the algebraic jurisprudence to
which these concepts may lead. In his Law as a Means to an End Jhering
considers the law not formalistically but as the practical instrument for
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the reconciliation of conflicting social interests. In his other works, such
as The Heaven of Juristic Concepts, he displayed a keen talent for satire,
attributing to theoretical jurists the use of a machine which he found in
their heaven, a machine capable of splitting a hair into 999,999 accurate
parts.
Mr. Seagle, although at present an Assistant Solicitor in the Department of Interior, was at one time law editor for the Encyclopedia of
the Social Sciencets. He writes always with deep sensitivity to the limitations of law, and insight into social problems. Man's struggle for law
was a struggle for peace, the peace of the tribe, of the market place, of
the king, through the reconciliation of conflicting interests. But they
cannot be so reconciled except by a man above the fray. Laws and opinions are words, and words are nature filtered through a personality. It
is in the personality of a man such as the late justice Holmes, that Mr.
Seagle sees one of the hopes for achieving peace through law in the
atomic age. Holmes' greatness according to Mr. Seagle, lies in the fact
of his objectivity in the face of every inclination to the contrary derived
from birth and training, in his toleration, for example, of social experiment, while he privately opined: "The notion that with socialized property we should have women free and a piano for everybody seems to
me an empty humbug."
Mr. Seagle sees the other hope for man's avoidance of a blood-feud
on the national level in the removal of the causes of economic and social
conflict which it is the task of law to reconcile.
Morris L. Weisberg.t
t Harry A. Bigelow Teaching Fellow, University of Chicago Law School.
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